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Essay

Representative Government,
Representative Court? The Supreme
Court as a Representative Body
Angela Onwuachi-Willig†
Central to our country’s idea of fairness within the court
system is the notion of the completely neutral arbiter.1 The archetype adjudicator remains uninfluenced by sources outside
the law (which itself is not free from human failings) and is entirely free of bias. Yet, as Judge Jerome Frank once declared,
we are well aware that a person does not “cease[] to be human
and strip[ ] himself [or herself] of all predilections” or “become[]
a passionless thinking machine” simply “by putting on a black
robe and taking the oath of office as a judge.”2 At a minimum,
we recognize the humanness of judges through concepts such as
recusal, which “recognize that judges will, from time to time,
have biases, prejudices, or interests that prevent truly unbiased decision-making.”3
† Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. E-mail:
aonwuachi@ucdavis.edu. J.D., University of Michigan Law School; B.A., Grinnell College. Thanks to Chris Elmendorf, Kevin Johnson, Carlton Larson, Evelyn Lewis, Daria Roithmayr, Madhavi Sunder, and Marty West for their helpful comments and support and to Dean Rex Perschbacher for his generous
support. My research assistant Andrea Fazel and the staff of the U.C. Davis
Law Library, especially Erin Murphy, provided valuable assistance. This Essay gained much from comments from the Symposium participants, editors,
and audience members. Most importantly, I thank my husband Jacob and my
children, Elijah and Bethany, for their constant love and support.
1. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
657, 661 (2005).
2. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652–53 (2d Cir. 1943).
3. Bassett, supra note 1, at 658; see also id. at 661 (describing the various ways in which bias can arise, including financial interest, favored relationships, and personal bias); Karen Nelson Moore, Appellate Review of Judicial Disqualification Decisions in the Federal Courts, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 829,
830–37 (1984) (describing situations that may warrant judicial disqualification).
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The fact is that background—or to put it differently, diversity—matters on judicial bodies. As Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explained, “[I]t is inevitable that judges’ different professional
and life experiences have some bearing on how they confront
various problems that come before them.”4 Thus, judges of all
backgrounds bring their own human experience to the bench.5
For this reason, it is important (as Professors Kevin Johnson,
Sherrilyn Ifill, and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer have argued) that
courts, especially the Supreme Court, are comprised of individuals who represent a cross section of the country—
individuals with differing views that are undeniably influenced
by life experience.6
This question of demographic representation on the Supreme Court was raised again most recently when President
George W. Bush initially nominated John Roberts to replace
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,7 the first woman to be appointed
to the Court and, at the time, one of only two women on the
nine-Justice Court.8 Many, including First Lady Laura Bush,

4. Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
325, 329 (2002); see also Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
1, 3 (1994) (asserting that “all judges, as part of basic human functioning,
bring to each decision a package of personal biases and beliefs that may unconsciously and unintentionally affect the decisionmaking process”).
5. See Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 10
ASIAN L.J. 127, 136–38 (2003) (describing how one judge’s childhood experience of watching his grandfather be humiliated because of limited Englishspeaking skills informed that judge’s understanding of language discrimination).
6. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality, and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 124–27
(1997) (asserting that racial minorities could seek to compel states to adopt
affirmative action judicial selection plans); Kevin R. Johnson & Luis FuentesRohwer, A Principled Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5, 6, 10 (2004) (analogizing judges to juries and arguing that, much like with diversity of juries, “pulling a group of judges from a
cross-section of the community would . . . benefit the decision-making process”).
7. See Elisabeth Bumiller, As All Washington Guessed, Bush Zeroed In
on His Choice, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at A16.
8. WILLIAM D. BADER & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED
EIGHT JUSTICES 14 (2004) (noting that Justice O’Connor was sworn in as the
first female Justice after a confirmation vote of 99 to 0 and that Justice Ginsburg was sworn in as the second female Justice to join O’Connor after a confirmation vote of 97 to 3).
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hoped that the President would appoint a woman to take Justice O’Connor’s seat.9
The stakes were high, apart from mere representation.
Liberals worried that a male Justice, especially one with conservative credentials, would not bring the same distinctive female, or rather minority, voice that a conservative Justice
O’Connor brought to important issues, such as abortion rights10
and affirmative action.11 Conservatives struggled with the potentially damaging political consequences of not naming a
woman to the high court when 60 percent of all Americans believed that appointing a woman was important.12 Even Justice
O’Connor remarked, while noting that Roberts himself is “firstrate,”13 that she was, “disappointed to see the percentage of
women on our court drop by 50 percent.”14 Many others agreed
that “something is lost when there is only one female voice in
the room.”15 As Karen O’Connor, director of Women and Poli9. See Mike Dorning & Andrew Martin, Nomination Vexes Liberals,
Women: Loss of 2nd Female Voice Is Seen as Cause for Concern, CHI. TRIB.,
July 21, 2005, at C1. Besides the First Lady urging the President to replace
O’Connor with a woman, other Republican women acknowledged the need for
more women on the Supreme Court. For instance, Republican Senator Olympia Snowe stated that “it would have been preferable to replace Sandra Day
O’Connor with a qualified, capable woman,” and Republican Senator Susan
Collins declared that, after Roberts’s nomination, “[s]he would like to see more
women on the Supreme Court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, Professor Marci Hamilton, a former O’Connor clerk, asserted: “The hope
was that this wasn’t a one-seat quota, that the number of women on the court
would expand.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. See David Stout & Elisabeth Bumiller, President’s Choice of Roberts
Ends a Day of Speculation, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2005, http://www.nytimes
.com/2005/07/19/politics/politicsspecial1/19cnd-judge.html (quoting a spokesperson at NARAL as stating: “If Roberts is confirmed to a lifetime appointment, there is little doubt that he will work to overturn Roe v. Wade”).
11. Former Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003), which upheld the constitutionality of the University of
Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program. Id. at 343.
12. Susan Estrich, Lack of Diversity on Supreme Court, NEWSMAX.COM,
July 24, 2005, http://newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/7/23/170018.shtml
(noting that 65 percent of Americans believed that it would be a good idea to
appoint a woman); Poll: Supreme Court Pick Matters, CBS NEWS, July 15,
2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/15/opinion/polls/main709505
.shtml (“Women are more likely than men to say it is very important to them
that a woman replaces O’Connor; 36 percent of women feel this way, compared
to just 13 percent of men.”).
13. Dorning & Martin, supra note 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Estrich, supra note 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Dorning & Martin, supra note 9. Justice O’Connor once said to the
1996 Women’s Olympic Basketball Team, which visited the Supreme Court, “I
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tics at American University explained, “While one woman can
make the argument when it comes to sex discrimination, Title
IX, [equal educational opportunities], [and] reproductive privacy, a second woman in the room helps solidify the positions
and makes the men understand some of the ramifications.”16
When Chief Justice Rehnquist passed away and Roberts
was nominated to fill the position of Chief Justice, the issue of
representation became an even stronger topic. Unlike replacing
Justice O’Connor with Roberts, the replacement of Chief Justice Rehnquist by the same candidate was perceived as noncontroversial, with one white male conservative replacing another. However, the pressure was on again for President Bush
to nominate a candidate who could bring a different voice than
that of Roberts, specifically another female Justice or a Justice
of color.17 The rationale behind these demands was that the
Court, although not directly, is a representative body, and the
most effective way of providing a broad range of voices on the
most powerful judicial institution in the country is to ensure
that people of all backgrounds—race, sex, class, religion, sexuality—are actually represented on the Court.
On October 3, 2005, President Bush responded to pressures
concerning the gender and/or racial background of the next potential Justice by nominating Harriet Ellan Miers, White
House counsel and his former personal attorney.18 Noting that
Miers would bring a distinctive perspective to the bench while
strictly interpreting the Constitution, President Bush defended
Miers as the right choice for the seat.19 Others also noted the
unique viewpoints that Miers, a woman, could bring to the
Court. For example, Professor Linda Eads of Southern Methodist University Law School explained that while Miers “doesn’t
can’t tell you how happy I was when she [Justice Ginsburg] got to the court. It
makes a night and day difference to have women on the bench.” William C.
Rhoden, A Mission Is Reaffirmed in the Nation’s Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1995, at B23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Dorning & Martin, supra note 9 (first alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
17. Elisabeth Bumiller et al., Bush Names Counsel as Choice for Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1 (“Mr. Bush had been under pressure
from interest groups to appoint a woman . . . .”); Michael A. Fletcher & Dan
Balz, Bush Faces Pressure to Diversify Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 25,
2005, at A4 (noting that “[a] number of Latino group officials have publicly
urged the president to name the first Hispanic to the high court”).
18. Michael Fletcher, White House Counsel Miers Chosen for Court, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at A1.
19. Id.
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wear her experiences on her sleeve,” the experience of trying to
find legal employment as a woman “affected her and she has to
know . . . that not all groups are always treated equally.”20
Miers’s nomination to the Court, however, was intensely
challenged by conservatives who questioned her record on constitutional law issues and felt that her nomination was pure
cronyism.21 On October 27, 2005, Miers quietly withdrew her
nomination for the Court, citing her refusal to release privileged documents concerning her work as the President’s chief
counsel as the reason for her withdrawal.22
Although First Lady Laura Bush continued to urge the
President to nominate a woman,23 the President instead nominated Samuel Alito,24 a decision that essentially ensured that
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg would soon become the only
woman sitting on the Court. President Bush’s decision to nominate a man for a second time to replace Justice O’Connor did
not receive nearly as much attention as his first selection.25
However, many politicians and activists continued to comment
on how the President’s third choice to replace Justice O’Connor

20. Todd S. Purdum & Neil A. Lewis, Hard-Working Advocate for the
President, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Ron Fournier, Bush Goes Right for Next Nominee, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Oct. 31, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 17778861 (“Miers bowed
out Thursday after three weeks of bruising criticism from members of Bush’s
own party, who argued the Texas lawyer and loyal Bush confidant had thin
credentials on constitutional law and no proven record as a judicial conservative.”); see also Randy E. Barnett, Cronyism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2005, at A26
(“Harriet Miers is not just the close confidante of the president in her capacity
as his staff secretary and then as White House counsel. She also was George
W. Bush’s personal lawyer. Apart from nominating his brother or former business partner, it is hard to see how the president could have selected someone
who fit Hamilton’s description any more closely.”) Some questioned whether
gender played a role in conservative opposition to Miers. Senator Diane Feinstein remarked, “I don’t believe they would have attacked a man the way she
was attacked . . . . I don’t think she deserves the treatment she got.” Edward
Epstein, Miers Withdraws as Court Nominee, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 2005, at
A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Epstein, supra note 21.
23. Peter Baker, Alito Nomination Sets Stage for Ideological Battle,
WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at A1.
24. Id.
25. Although the President chose a man to replace Justice O’Connor, his
selection of Alito did not result in any immediate political damage to the party
or the nomination, with 54 percent of Americans in December, 2005, agreeing
that the Senate should confirm Alito. Jon Cohen, Poll: Majority Wants Alito on
Supreme Court, ABCNEWS.COM, Dec. 21, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
print?id=1426504.
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reflected a lack of commitment to diversity on the Court. For
instance, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid proclaimed, “This
appointment ignores the value of diverse backgrounds and perspectives.”26 According to Senator Reid, “President Bush would
leave the Supreme Court looking less like America and more
like an old boys club.”27 Again, much like with President Bush’s
first selection of now Chief Justice Roberts to replace a retiring
Justice O’Connor, the decision to fill her seat with Alito would
result in replacing a moderate, who was often the swing vote on
issues such as affirmative action and abortion (both issues that
significantly affect women), with a conservative, white male
judge.28
This idea of filling a vacancy left by Justice O’Connor with
a man was even a concern for some conservative activists, who
had expressed a preference for the President to nominate a
woman for the position.29 For example, although the vast majority of conservative activists indicated that neither race nor
sex should matter in the President’s selection,30 others such as
Traditional Values Coalition Chairman Louis P. Sheldon asserted the following: “I think we should have a woman this
time . . . . Isn’t the [Justice] retiring a woman?”31 In sum, many
agreed with Justice O’Connor, who argued before the nomination of Alito: “Women constitute one half of the population in
this country. It is critical for women to serve in all branches of
government.”32

26. Bush Nominates Alito to Supreme Court: Conservatives, Liberals
Ready for Heated Debate, CNN.COM, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
POLITICS/10/31/scotus.bush/index.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Baker, supra note 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Liza Porteus, Bush Taps Alito for Supreme Court, FOXNEWS.COM,
Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,173968,00.html.
29. Conservatives Look Past Miers: Leaders Say They Want Justice with
Clear Conservative Views, CNN.COM, Oct. 28, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
POLITICS/10/28/scotus.next/index.html.
30. Lanier Swann, the director of government relations for Concerned
Women for America declared, “For us it is not about sex, race or creed . . . . It
is really about their ability to fairly interpret the Constitution.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted)
31. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sheldon
then identified Edith Jones, Priscilla Owen, and Janice Rogers Brown as potential choices to replace O’Connor. Id.
32. Supreme Court Watch Resumes, CBSNEWS.COM, Oct. 30, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/10/28/supremecourt/main989993.shtml
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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This Essay contends, quite simply, that diversity matters
on the Court and that the Court should be a demographically
representative body of the citizens of the United States. Thereafter, building on this notion that diversity is critical to the performance of the Court in its deliberations on cases, this Essay
then proposes, as a thinking point, that the number of Supreme
Court Justices be expanded to increase the representation of
various demographic groups and ensure proper representation
of all voices on the most powerful judicial body of our nation.
I. WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A WISE
OLD MAN AND A WISE OLD WOMAN?
“A system of justice is the richer for the diversity of background and experience of its participants. It is the poorer, in
terms of evaluating what is at stake and the impact of its judgments, if its members—its lawyers, jurors, and judges—are all
cast from the same mold.”
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg33
Under our system of government, elected officials in the
legislative and executive braches are to provide adequate political representation for their constituents. On the other hand,
the federal judiciary, which is composed of individuals appointed by our President, is not viewed as a representative
body. Instead, the federal judiciary, although appointed to the
bench and voted on by elected officials, is set up to be free from
outside pressures in performing its duties and is to provide a
check on, and balance against, other branches of government.
Given the power and influence of the federal judiciary, in
particular the Supreme Court, the question is whether that
check itself should be checked by a demographically representative cross section of the United States. In other words, in
what ways should the judiciary, although not directly, be
viewed as representative body of the people?
Judge Richard Posner has maintained,
The nation contains such a diversity of moral and political thinking
that the judiciary, if it is to retain its effectiveness, its legitimacy, has
to be heterogeneous; . . . and the members of a heterogeneous judicial
community are not going to subscribe to a common set of moral and

33. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Supreme Court: A Place for Women, 32 SW.
U. L. REV. 189, 190 (2003).
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political dogmas that would make their decisionmaking determinate.34

At the present moment, however, our federal judiciary does not
reflect the rich racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of our nation. For example, as Magistrate Judge Edward Chen of the
Northern District of California, the first Asian Pacific American
to be named to the federal bench in that district, has asserted,
the federal bench is incredibly lacking in racial diversity.35 As
of September 30, 2001, out of nearly 1600 active federal judges,
including Article III, magistrate, bankruptcy, and court of
claims judges, only 7.2 percent were Blacks, 4.0 percent were
Latino/as, 0.8 percent were Asian-Americans, and 0.1 percent
were American Indians, while Blacks, Latinos, AsianAmericans, and American Indians respectively constituted
12.3, 12.5, 3.7, and 0.9 percent of the population in the United
States.36 Further, even though women comprise at least half
the population, in 2005, they only held roughly a quarter of all
federal judgeships.37
The Supreme Court, given its size, is arguably more diverse than the lower federal courts with respect to racial diversity. Of its nine Justices, one is a black male, Justice Clarence
Thomas, making racial minorities 11 percent of the Court.
With respect to other factors such as education, class, and
even religion, the Supreme Court, however, is less diverse. All
nine of the Justices on the Court graduated from elite law
schools, which in itself placed them in a select category of lawyers who had their choice of jobs early on in their careers, with
the exception of Justices Ginsburg and Thomas, who had difficulty finding jobs after law school because of their sex and race,
respectively.38 All of the Justices, except for Justices Ginsburg
34. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 94 (2003);
see also Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law
That Is Inclusive? What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the
Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 106–07 (2004) (asserting that “constitutional judgments are visibly biased when the Supreme Court or other courts
selectively strip out social and racial context to conform with the identitybased views of the majority”).
35. Chen, supra note 5, at 128–29.
36. Id. at 129; see also Elizabeth A. Kronk, Hundreds of Nations, Millions
of People: One Senior Judge on the Federal Bench, FED. LAW., July 2005, at 16,
16 (discussing the consequences of having no active American Indian judges
on the federal bench).
37. Marcia Coyle, Justices Diversity Pool Too Shallow?, NAT’L L.J., Sept.
26, 2005, at 1.
38. Justice Ginsburg experienced discrimination when she sought em-
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and Thomas, grew up in comfortably middle- to upper-class
families.39 Five of the nine Justices are Catholic, with the remainder of the Court consisting of only two Jews, one Protestant, and an Episcopalian.40 None of the Justices are openly
gay, and none of them are of Latino, Asian American, or Native
American descent. Yet, the Justices on the Supreme Court are
left with the task and enormous responsibility of interpreting
the Constitution and laws of the nation for the entire rich diversity of people who reside in the United States.
One may ask, “If the law is simply the law, why does this
issue of representation on the Court even matter?” After all, as
former Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Mary Jeanne Coyne
proclaimed, “[A] wise old man and a wise old woman reach the
same conclusion.”41
Perhaps Justice Ginsburg provided the best answer to this
question of why it matters who sits on the Court, when she
agreed that Justice Coyne was correct to state that a wise old
man and woman do reach the same decision, but declared: “[I]t
is also true that women, like persons of different racial groups
and ethnic origins, contribute to the United States judiciary

ployment after graduation from law school. Despite her excellent credentials,
Ginsburg “received no job offers from New York law firms” and was not “able
to obtain a clerkship interview with a Supreme Court Justice.” SUPREME HISTORICAL SOC’Y, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES
1789–1995, at 532 (Clare Cushman ed., 1995). Ultimately, District Court
Judge Edmund L. Palmieri hired Ginsburg as his law clerk. Id. Justice Thomas also experienced racial discrimination upon his graduation from Yale Law
School when he was rejected by every law firm in Atlanta. Angela OnwuachiWillig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice Clarence Thomas
Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931, 970–
71 (2005). Like Justices Ginsburg and Thomas, retired Justice O’Connor also
experienced severe employment discrimination after law school. Even though
O’Connor graduated at the top of her class at Stanford Law School, “no private
firm would hire her to do a lawyer’s work” after graduation. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women’s Progress in the Legal Profession in the United
States, 33 TULSA L.J. 13, 14 (1997) (quoting O’Connor as saying, “I interviewed
with law firms in Los Angeles and San Francisco, . . . but none had ever hired
a woman before as a lawyer, and they were not prepared to do so” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The
Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1992) (describing the
gender discrimination she experienced “when law firms would only hire [her],
a ‘lady lawyer,’ as a legal secretary”).
39. Cf. Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 664 (1985) (asserting that federal judges “are overwhelmingly Anglo, male, well educated
and upper or upper middle class”).
40. See Baker, supra note 23.
41. Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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what . . . [is] fittingly called ‘a distinctive medley of views influenced by differences in biology, cultural impact, and life experience.’”42 The fact is that one’s background, while it may not determine one’s vote, may affect how one approaches and
perceives the issues in a case.43 This effect of background on
decision making even applies to majority judges, who because
of the way society is structured with them at the center as the
norm, are often viewed as being neutral, objective, and unaffected by their background.44 In other words, while Justices
and judges of different backgrounds—whether a wise old man
or a wise old woman—may often reach the same conclusion, the
idea of complete neutrality on the bench is a myth.
One good example of how the jurisprudence of a Justice
may be influenced by her background, specifically her gender,
is Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudence on discrimination, the Establishment Clause, the right to abortion, and affirmative action.45 Professor Suzanna Sherry hinted that Justice
42. Id. (quoting the late Alvin B. Rubin, former judge of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); see also Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6,
at 6 (“Virtually every legal actor understands that a judge’s biases, perspectives, and life experiences influence judicial decision-making.”).
43. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 134 (noting, for example, that
“there is solid evidence that race affects judging”).
44. See Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013 (1995)
(“Thus, white people frequently interpret norms adopted by a dominantly
white culture as racially neutral, and so fail to recognize the ways in which
those norms may be in fact covertly race-specific.”); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was
Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and The Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 977 (1993) (noting that “[t]he pervasiveness of the transparency phenomenon militates against an unsupported
faith by whites in the reality of race-neutral decisionmaking”); Berta
Esperanza Hernández Truyol, Building Bridges—Latinas and Latinos at the
Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 369, 372–73 (1994) (“Traditional legal thought—the purportedly objective, rational, neutral legal analysis—constituted the ‘norm,’ the aspirational
‘neutral’ (reasonable) person: a white, formally educated, middle to upper
class, heterosexual, physically and mentally able, Judeo-Christian, Western
European/Anglo male.”); Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 604–05 (1999) (“When people are asked to describe themselves in a few words, [black] people invariably note their race and
white people almost never do. Surveys tell us that virtually all [black] people
notice the importance of race several times a day. White people rarely contemplate the fact of our whiteness—it is the norm, the given. It is a privilege to
not have to think about race.” (footnotes omitted)).
45. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 17; Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 543, 592–616 (1986).
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O’Connor’s status as woman, an outsider of sorts, helps to explain “her greater willingness [than former Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who was of similar politics] to remedy the effects of
race discrimination and discrimination against aliens” and “her
reluctance to accept conduct that condemns groups or individuals to outsider status.”46 Similarly, it is rumored that Justice
O’Connor, often a swing vote on cases concerning affirmative
action, declared the following in response to a tirade by Justice
Scalia about the evils of the policy: “But, Nino, if it weren’t for
affirmative action, I wouldn’t be here.”47
Other Justices on the Supreme Court have been likewise
influenced by their backgrounds in their approach to cases. As
several Justices have noted, among the strengths that Justice
Thurgood Marshall brought to the Supreme Court were his
unique perspectives as a result of his life experiences with race
and racism. For instance, Justice Brennan once proclaimed:
“What made Thurgood Marshall unique as a Justice? Above all,
it was the special voice that he added to the Court’s deliberations and decisions. His was a voice of authority: he spoke from
first-hand knowledge of the law’s failure to fulfill its promised
protections for so many Americans.”48 In the same vein, the
background of Justice Thomas, the only racial minority currently on the Court, has certainly had an impact on the development of his jurisprudence.49 For example, Professor Mark

46. Sherry, supra note 45, at 595–96.
47. Oyez.org, Antonin Scalia, http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legal_
entity/103/biography (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105
HARV. L. REV. 23, 23 (1991); see also Anthony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1221 (1992) (noting how Justice Marshall reminded the other Justices of their “moral obligation as a people to confront those tragedies of the human condition which continue to haunt even the
richest and freest of countries”); O’Connor, supra note 38, at 1217 (“Justice
Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences, constantly pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness of
legal argument but also to the power of moral truth.”); Byron R. White, A
Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1992)
(“Thurgood brought to the conference table years of experience in an area that
was of vital importance to our work, experience that none of us could claim to
match. . . . [H]e told us much that we did not know due to the limitations of
our own experience.”).
49. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 137 (“Justice Thomas reaches his
conclusions using both his racial experience and his belief about the permissible role of government in social interventions under the Constitution.” (footnotes omitted)); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 38, at 978–1000 (arguing that
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Tushnet finds traces of black nationalism in several of Justice
Thomas’s opinions.50 Likewise, Professor Guy-Uriel Charles
has written about how the idea of racial authenticity has
played a role in providing Justice Thomas with a kind of “epistemic authority” on certain racial issues before the Court,51 and
I have written about the role that both race and racism have
played in shaping Justice Thomas’s judicial philosophies as a
black conservative.52
As several commentators have noted, even diversity in
work experience matters. During the candidacy of former Supreme Court nominee, Harriett Miers, several politicians and
scholars highlighted her lack of experience as a judge, or rather
her experience as an attorney in the “real world,” as a plus factor in her nomination. For instance, Senate Minority Leader
Harry Reid stated, “I like Harriet Miers. . . . In my view, the
Supreme Court would benefit from the addition of a justice who
has real experience as a practicing lawyer.”53 Similarly, Professor Marci Hamilton indicated that she found Miers’s background as a player in local and state politics in Texas “crucial”
to the Supreme Court—much in the same way that Justice
O’Connor’s sensitivities as a result of her experience as a state
legislator and judge were.54
Adding a diversity of voices—whether due to background
differences in race, gender, childhood class status, sexuality, religion, or work—will only enrich the decision-making process.55
Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence in certain areas is steeped in black conservative thought); Kendall Thomas, Reading Clarence Thomas, 18 NAT’L BLACK
L.J. 224, 227 (2004–2005) (arguing that some of Thomas’s writings on the
Court are personal as well as professional).
50. See Mark Tushnet, Clarence Thomas’s Black Nationalism, 47 HOW.
L.J. 323 passim (2004).
51. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575, 608–28 (2005).
52. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 38 passim.
53. Press Release, Senator Harry Reid, Statement of Senator Harry Reid
on the Nomination of Harriet Miers to the U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 3, 2005),
http://reid.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=246777; see also Molly McDonough, Harriet Miers’ ‘Unknown’ Story: Colleagues Cite Her Work Ethic, Integrity and
Discretion, 4 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT (2005), http://www.abanet.org/journal/
ereport/oc7sct.html (noting that like Justice O’Connor, who was a state legislator, Miers’s work experience in Texas may be of value to the Court).
54. McDonough, supra note 53; see also Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at
132 (citing a study of labor cases that revealed “that prior experience[s] representing management and graduation from an elite college were significant factors in predicting whether a judge would rule in favor of management”).
55. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master’s “Tool” to Dismantle
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A Justice may contribute, depending on his of her or her own
life experiences, important insights that others around them
lack.56 In fact, Professor Sylvia Lazos Vargas relies on the reasoning in Grutter v. Bollinger57 to argue that diverse perspectives and the value of diversity in improving learning and education through a robust exchange of ideas apply equally to the
judiciary.58 Just as on college and university campuses, mere
token representation of minority groups on the Supreme Court
will not result in a sufficient dialogue and exchange among the
Justices, who are interpreting the very basis by which all
Americans must live.59 Instead, “[a] critical mass is necessary
because what is sought is a dialogic environment where disagreement as to racial perspective can be freely and candidly
expressed, forcing majority colleagues to consider perspectives
and realities with which they are not familiar.”60
Indeed, precisely because of the distinctive perspectives
that nominees with differing life experiences may bring to the
Court, diversity that reflects the make-up of the population in
the United States would add greater legitimacy to the institution in the eyes of the public.61 Specifically, the rulings of the
Court would carry more weight and contain greater authority if
they were viewed as coming from a body that was comprised of
a cross-section of the nation. Additionally, as Professor Kevin
Johnson has noted, the inclusion of more voices of people from
underrepresented groups on the Court “would send a powerful
message of inclusion” to those who have traditionally been excluded from American discourse62 or, more importantly, to
His House: Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 135–48 (2005) (discussing the value of race diversity
on the bench); see also Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 26 (“Giveand-take in arguments and deliberations generally sharpens the analysis and
affects the outcome.”).
56. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 55, at 143–48 (discussing Justice
Thomas’s role in recent affirmative action cases).
57. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
58. Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 143–48.
59. Id. at 145–46.
60. Id. at 145.
61. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 28; see also Lazos
Vargas, supra note 34, at 141 (“Inclusive judging provides a reason for minority citizens to continue to trust key governmental institutions and believe that
they are neutral rather than political.”).
62. Kevin R. Johnson, On the Appointment of a Latina/o to the Supreme
Court, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 2 (2002); see also id. at 3 (“The nomination of an African American [Thurgood Marshall] alone represented an achievement for the
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those who have so often turned to the Court to protect their
civil rights when elected officials failed them.63 Finally, as Professor Ifill notes, “[D]iversity on the bench . . . encourages judicial impartiality, by ensuring that a single set of values or
views do not dominate judicial decision-making.”64 Indeed, no
goal should be more important on the Court than ensuring impartiality through this balancing of differing values, views, and
voices. For this reason, a Supreme Court that mirrors the population of the United States in all of its diversity is essential.
II. DOES SIZE MATTER?
“A necessary step to achieving a judging ethic where differing racial perspectives and realities are part of the judging
process is garnering a critical mass of minority judges and those
with an ‘outsider’ perspective on key benches.”
Professor Sylvia Lazos Vargas65
To enhance the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and to ensure inclusion of our nation’s diversity of moral and political
thinking we must increase the representation of demographic
groups on the Court. Therefore, I propose, as a thinking matter,
that the number of Supreme Court Justices be expanded from
nine to fifteen.66 As it currently stands, it seems difficult to culentire African American community, unmistakably signaling that it in fact is
an important part of the nation as a whole.”).
63. Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 102 (noting that “African Americans
are . . . the racial group most likely to believe that the United States Supreme
Court should serve as the guardian of civil rights for all Americans”); Joan
Biskupic, Thomas Caught Up in Conflict: Jurist’s Court Rulings, Life Experience Are at Odds, Many Blacks Say, WASH. POST, June 7, 1996, at A20 (noting
that Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law School has described the Supreme
Court as “the ultimate place that black people had been able to go to vindicate
their rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models
and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 411 (2000). Judge Posner
echoes this point in his scholarship:
[A] judiciary homogeneous in background, gender, ethnicity, and
other factors that, realistically speaking, influence judgment on issues of high policy would be a disaster. It would be unrepresentative,
blind to many important issues, adrift from the general culture, quite
possibly extreme, and on all four counts deficient in authority and
even legitimacy. The only practical means of stabilizing law in our
system is . . . to maintain a diverse judiciary . . . .
POSNER, supra note 34, at 354.
65. Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 143.
66. I chose the number fifteen because it is the size of the International
Court of Justice, a court on which all fifteen justices work together in reaching
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tivate any meaningful type of demographic and substantive
representation on the Court with just nine Justices. That low
number combined with the rarity of openings on the Court because of lifetime appointments67 only works to deepen political
battles and opposition to Presidential nominees to the Court.68
The notion of “one black seat” or “two female seats” on the Supreme Court strengthens the likelihood of intense opposition to
candidates, especially female and minority candidates who may
be viewed as controversial. For example, one must wonder
whether opposition to Justice Thomas would have been as
strong had there also been another black “Justice Marshall” on
the Court to counter the conservative black Justice.69 As Professor Lazos Vargas has argued, “The lesson from Grutter is
that to achieve a diverse judicial bench, diversity must be understood to go beyond token appointments of minority judges,
decisions on cases and which is premised on a formula designed to include
“representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 3, 9, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1055–56, 3 Bevans 1153, 1179, 1181. One understanding of the court is “that the regional distribution of seats among the Members
of the Court should roughly parallel the regional distribution of seats on the
Security Council.” ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT
WORKS 45 (Terry D. Gill ed., 6th rev. ed. 2003).
67. 2 JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER WITT, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
816 (3d ed. 1997).
68. See Johnson, supra note 62, at 2 n.6 (“Judicial appointments often provoke pitched political battles.”); Editorial, The President’s Stealth Nominee,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A26 (noting how judicial selection has become
politicized).
69. Blacks were very divided on the issue of Thomas’s being appointed to
the Supreme Court. For example, the National Bar Association, the premier
organization of black lawyers, was divided on Thomas’s nomination—128 to
oppose, 124 to support, and 31 to take no position. See A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1405, 1407
(1995). Although traditional civil rights groups, such as the NAACP, opposed
Thomas’s appointment to the bench, polls showed that anywhere from 50 percent to 70 percent of Blacks supported Thomas’s nomination. See Suzanne P.
Kelly, NAACP President Vows to Continue Fight for Civil Rights, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Oct. 18, 1991, at 2B, available at 1991 WLNR 3716048; Arch
Parsons, Thomas Issue Split Black Leaders from Grass Roots: Consequences of
“the Gap” Being Discussed, BALT. SUN, Oct. 20, 1991, at 1G, available at 1991
WLNR 746599; see also Peggy Peterman, Most Blacks Glad Thomas Confirmed, Now Want Him to Change, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991, at
13A, available at 1991 WLNR 1928209 (“[M]ore [black people] were for Clarence Thomas than were against him, but it’s close. . . . [A] sizable number of
black people say they simply want an African-American on the U.S. Supreme
Court. If it’s got to be a tarnished Clarence Thomas, so be it. That’s what happens when it takes so long for a group of people, such as African-Americans, to
get recognition.”).
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and instead the goal should be to achieve a critical mass of minority judges . . . on [the] bench.”70 Groups, especially underrepresented groups such as Blacks would certainly have a
greater appreciation of the diversity in viewpoint and judicial
philosophy that a “Justice Thomas” brings if his presence did
not necessarily signify to them the exclusion of many of their
own voices from the bench.71
Because of the way that tokenism currently operates, however, once one minority is on an appellate court, such as the
Supreme Court, room is almost never made for another. Once
one minority is on the bench, the politicians who hold the responsibility of appointing people to the bench believe their job
is done, and they have little political incentive to create further
diversity on that court.72 As Professor Lazos Vargas explains,
“After ‘firsts,’ politics as usual takes over, and . . . minorities
have not yet been able to gain a sufficient foothold in this political game” concerning appointments.73 In the end, when push
comes to shove, it is often the expectations of racial minorities
that are sacrificed.74 As we recently witnessed with the nominations of Harriet Miers, a white woman, and ultimately Samuel Alito, a white male, to the Supreme Court as opposed to
that of Alberto Gonzales (who while opposed by some Latino
organizations was supported by others),75 these days suspected
judicial philosophies win over any desire to have racial and
ethnic diversity.76 Were the number of Justices on the Court increased to fifteen, it would certainly create more room and
fewer excuses for politicians to fail to truly account for and
70. Lazos Vargas, supra note 34, at 109.
71. See id. at 151 (“Battles over judicial nominations like Miguel
Estrada’s unfold because we have settled for only a token number of minority
judges on key benches. . . . The politics of judicial diversity appointments are
vicious because once a minority judge is named to a highly visible bench, it is
unlikely that another minority judge will subsequently be appointed.”).
72. See id. at 148–51.
73. Id. at 149.
74. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–24 (1980) (describing the
principle of interest convergence, in which the rights of blacks are always sacrificed whenever they conflict with white interests).
75. See Fletcher & Balz, supra note 17; see also Lazos Vargas, supra note
34, at 150–51 (describing the same split within the Latino/Latina community
over Miguel Estrada’s nomination to the D.C. Circuit).
76. Coyle, supra note 37 (quoting Professor Sheldon Goldman of the University of Massachusetts–Amherst as stating that “[f ]or Bush, diversity is very
important but ideology trumps diversity” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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value diversity in their nominations and votes. This is not to
say that increasing the number of Justices on the Court will
guarantee diversity, just that it would make the possibility of
such diversity greater despite politics. As it currently stands,
we are so wedded to this notion of which seat is a woman’s seat
versus a minority seat, that it is hard for politicians to envision
seats other than those already filled by women and minorities
as seats suitable for minority or female nominees. There appears to be a tipping point at which minorities and women are
no longer considered.77 One must wonder if it were Justice
Scalia who was retiring rather than Justice O’Connor whether
there would have been any mention at all of diversity—of filling
his vacancy with a woman or minority. Adding new seats to the
Court would help to alleviate this problem. To the extent there
is a tipping point, appointing the second racial minority to the
tenth seat on the Court is likely to look and feel different than
appointing the second racial minority to the ninth seat.
Furthermore, little in history indicates that the choice to
have nine Justices on the Supreme Court is inflexible. Indeed,
all factors indicate that the selection of the number nine for the
size of the Court is more of a historical accident than a reflection of any conscious decision that nine was the right number
for decision making.
The number of Supreme Court Justices at any given time
has ranged from five to ten.78 First, the number of Justices on
the Court began at six as mandated by the Judiciary Act of
1789.79 A few years later, political battles resulted in the passage of the Circuit Court Act of 1801, which reduced that number from six to five.80 The very next year, Congress repealed the
1801 Act, reestablishing the number of Supreme Court Justices
at six.81 Because of increasing work on the Court for the Jus-

77. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE 140–161 (1987) (analyzing the tipping point at which no more
minority faculty would be hired on a predominantly white faculty); Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 215, 226–31 (1998) (analyzing a
similar scenario regarding residential segregation).
78. BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 67, at 816–17.
79. Id. at 816.
80. Id. (noting that the Circuit Court Act was intended to prevent the
newly elected president at the time, Thomas Jefferson, from filling any vacancies on the Supreme Court).
81. Id.
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tices, especially greater burdens caused by growing circuit duties as new circuits were added, Congress enacted the Judiciary
Act of 1807, which increased the number of Justices from six to
seven.82 In 1837, two more seats were added, creating nine
seats on the Supreme Court.83 In 1863, Congress passed more
legislation increasing the number of Justices to ten.84 Three
years later in 1866, political tensions again played a role in the
structure of the Court, cutting its size down to seven because of
a desire to prevent President Andrew Johnson from appointing
people who would “represent” his views about the unconstitutionality of Reconstruction legislation.85
The last adjustment to the Court size would come another
three years later, with an increase from seven to nine Justices
through the Judiciary Act of 1869.86 The Act provided: “[T]he
Supreme Court of the United States shall hereafter consist of
the Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum . . . .”87 Ever
since, the size of the Court has remained at nine.88 But such
permanence did not come without effort. In 1937, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt tried to pack the Court with Justices who would be sympathetic to his New Deal legislative
proposals.89
In sum, there are no apparent reasons for not increasing
the number of Justices on the Supreme Court. Some criticisms
about the size of the Court came in 1937 from several Justices
themselves, who declared the following in opposition to President Roosevelt’s “court-packing” plan:
“[A] Court of nine is as large a court as is manageable. The Court
could do its work, except for writing of the opinions, a good deal better
if it were five rather than nine. Every man who is added to the Court
adds another voice in counsel, and the most difficult work of the
Court . . . is that that [sic] is done around the counsel table; and if you
make the Court a convention instead of a small body of experts, you

82. Id. at 816–17.
83. Id. at 816.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court
Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1154, 1162 & n.31 (2006) (discussing fluctuations in
the size of the Court during Reconstruction).
86. BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 67, at 816.
87. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44.
88. BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 67, at 816.
89. Id. at 817; see also Vermeule, supra note 85, at 1156 (outlining Roosevelt’s court-packing plan).
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will simply confuse counsel. It will confuse counsel within the Court,
and will cloud the work of the Court and deteriorate and degenerate
it.”90

Although increasing the size of the Court to fifteen may
make it more difficult to reach majority decisions and build
consensus, especially given the complexity of the cases the Supreme Court decides to review, such factors should not serve as
a barrier to providing the full range of voices that can be represented on a larger Court. To my mind, the benefits of increased
participation on the Supreme Court—such as greater legitimacy, a stronger dialogue between Justices, and the inclusion
of a broader range of values and voices—far outweigh the negatives. Furthermore, there is precedent for such large decisionmaking judicial bodies on difficult legal issues in circuit court
en-banc hearings.91
Although en banc review does not come without its criticisms,92 most of these critiques are irrelevant when applied to
the Supreme Court, which unlike en banc courts, consists of
Justices who regularly work together in deliberating on and deciding cases. Arguments against the use of en banc proceedings
include notions that such proceedings: (1) detract from the efficiency of appellate courts’ decision making by requiring all the
circuit judges to engage in, on top of all their usual work, another round of written and oral arguments and deliberations;
(2) undermine the finality of three-judge panel decisions; (3)
displace resources that would otherwise be applied to non–en
banc cases; (4) allow a politicized majority to abuse the process
in a way that is designed to advance their own ideologies; (5)

90. BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 67, at 817 (quoting Charles Evans
Hughes’s letter to Congress dated March 21, 1937) (omission in original).
91. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2000) (encoding the number of circuit judges on
each of the several circuits); id. § 46(c) (specifying the number of circuit judges
who sit during en banc review); FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (determining when a
hearing or rehearing en banc may be ordered); Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v.
Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326, 335 (1941) (upholding the right of circuit courts to conduct en banc rehearings of prior three-judge panel decisions).
92. See, e.g., Irving R. Kaufman, Do the Costs of the En Banc Proceeding
Outweigh Its Advantages?, 69 JUDICATURE 7, 7 (1985) (“It is axiomatic that
three judges, in an intimate conference, will find the heart of a case more
quickly than will eleven.”). En banc review is also not favored by the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (“An en banc hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered . . . .”); see also Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29, 29–30
(1988) (explaining that en banc reviews comprise less than 1 percent of cases
decided on the merits).
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result in fragmented, ambiguous opinions from the court; and
(6) increase the difficulty of decision making among judges by
increasing the number of arbiters involved in any decision.93
Unlike with circuit courts, however, an increase in the
number of Justices on the Supreme Court would not negatively
influence the Court by causing additional burdens of work, displacement of resources, or political abuses by majorities who
can vote to come together to hear a case and advance their
views. Unlike for federal appellate courts, merely increasing
the number of Justices does not require any additional hearings that may divert attention from the usual work of the Supreme Court, nor does it create any further potential for ideological majorities to hold special hearings to advance their
interpretations of the law. As Professor Michael Solimine has
explained, “[T]he Supreme Court always sits en banc.”94 Furthermore, unlike decisions before circuit courts, the finality of
decisions before the Supreme Court would not be disturbed by
the implementation of my proposal to enlarge the Court. After
all, the Supreme Court is the final word on matters before the
judiciary.
Even those criticisms of en banc review that apply to the
Supreme Court do not present any serious concerns to my proposal for enlarging the Court. While it is true that having a
greater number of Justices on the Supreme Court may result in
more frequent authoring of concurring and dissenting opinions—and thus may result in more “ambiguous” decisions from
the Court—these factors pose less risk of having any substantial effect on the Supreme Court than on circuit courts. First,
because Supreme Court Justices have lifetime appointments
and regularly work together to decide cases, they are unlike an
en banc court that meets infrequently and are much more
skilled at accommodating each other’s views in their work. This
argument is supported by the findings of Professors Lewis
Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager, who contend that “multijudge courts are quite capable of behaving consistently. If each
judge on a court acts consistently from case to case, so too will
the court that they constitute.”95 Second, unlike three-judge
93. See Solimine, supra note 92, at 30, 32, 38–39; Michael Ashley Stein,
Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc
Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 805, 829–51 (1993).
94. Solimine, supra note 92, at 49.
95. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.J. 82, 83 (1986).
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panel circuit decisions, the drafting of concurrences and dissents for Supreme Court cases is already a widespread practice
and thus presents no real difference to the Court’s usual
method of resolving cases. Although I realize that there are
concerns about the number of separate opinions written by Justices on the Court, I am not convinced that the authoring of
these separate opinions is a serious cause for concern in every
case. To the extent that these separate opinions ensure the inclusion of another voice, their existence is surely a positive. Additionally, as Professor Michael Stein has argued,
Because multiple opinions generally make individual judges’ positions
on specific issues more readily comprehensible and predictable . . .
they add “considerable rationality, continuity, and legitimacy to the
decision making process.” This is especially true of dissenting opinions . . . . Consequently, “[s]ome of our greatest jurisprudence has
been introduced into the law in the form of dissents and expressions
of minority views.”96

Moreover, while decisions by a fifteen-member Court may
lead to more “vague” decisions as a result of the need to build a
consensus among a larger number of Justices, it will also certainly lead, if principles of diversity are kept in mind, to the inclusion of a broader range of voices in the decision. If this “difficulty” in achieving uniformity in decisions is the price we must
pay as the result of a larger Court, then that price is certainly
worth what we would gain through greater inclusion of voices
and increased legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the public.
Indeed, one of the benefits of an en banc court is that it “permit[s] the full complement of judges to pass on cases of exceptional importance.”97 And, Supreme Court cases are, by definition, of exceptional importance. Increasing the number of
Justices to allow a full complement of voices across the United
States to be represented in that process can only work to better
the decision-making process. As many scholars have argued,
“the involvement and interaction of more judges leads to
sounder decisions.”98 In fact, Professors Kornhauser and Sager
contend that “enlarging the number of judges who sit on a court
can be expected to improve the court’s performance.”99 Furthermore, just as “an en banc decision is assumed to command

96. Stein, supra note 93, at 840–41 (citations omitted).
97. Solimine, supra note 92, at 39 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
98. Id. at 40.
99. Kornhauser and Sager, supra note 95, at 83.
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greater authority and compliance, since it is not simply the
product of a three-judge panel,”100 a Supreme Court decision
will command greater legitimacy if it is not simply the product
of a narrow set of Justices with like racial, class, gender, work,
sexuality, and religious backgrounds.
Finally, because I recognize that appointing six Justices at
one time by one President may lead to other types of diversity
but not necessarily diversity in general ideology, I recommend
that this proposed increase in the size of the Court be phased
in, with each addition requiring a supermajority approval by
Congress. In other words, I believe that these concerns of diversity should be considered and worked toward over time and
with much care. Specifically, I recommend that two Justices be
appointed to the bench every three years until the Court
reaches the size of fifteen. Thereafter, we could return to our
present practice of filling in openings as Justices retire from
their lifetime term.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I believe that diversity matters very much
on the Court and increasing the size of the Court may be a
means of helping to create true diversity, not just tokenism. As
we have seen during the tenure of Justices Marshall, O’Connor,
Thomas, and even majority Justices—who as a result of having
their privileged status, are viewed as being nonraced, nongendered, and uninfluenced by background—one’s life experiences certainly affect one’s judicial philosophy.
At the same time, however, I recognize that even similar
backgrounds due to race, religion, gender, and other factors
may themselves result in different voices among Justices
within their own small communities.101 But our experience
with the judiciary leads me to believe that a higher number of
differing voices on the bench will lead, not only to better decision making, but also to greater appreciation and acceptance
during the appointment process of the full range of voices that
may exist within different marginalized communities—that is,
if tokenism is not continued in a way that excludes certain underrepresented voices at the expense of others.102 Finally, a di100. Solimine, supra note 92, at 40.
101. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 55, at 148–53 (describing differences
in the judicial thinking of Justices Marshall and Thomas).
102. Cf. Coyle, supra note 37 (“‘[I]t’s not the case that Latino activists
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verse, “representative” Court would signal to all members of society that their voices not only matter but are critical to the
process of justice and fairness.103
In essence, this proposal is not just about the physical/descriptive representation over substantive representation.
For the Court to increase its legitimacy and effectiveness, it is
necessary to have a broad and fully inclusive range of voices on
the bench.104 As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg made clear while
commenting on the open position that had been left by Justice
O’Connor, it is not so much the physical representation itself
that is important, but the representation of voice.105 Increasing
the number of Supreme Court Justices from nine to fifteen is a
sound and workable way to achieve that goal.

groups are going to oppose all conservative Latino nominees. If a conservative
is in the mainstream, they will support a Latino because of the benefits of adding diversity to the court.’” (quoting Kevin R. Johnson, Associate Dean and
Public Interest Professor of Law and Chicana/o Studies at the University of
California–Davis School of Law)).
103. Johnson, supra note 62, at 12 (indicating that “the appointment of a
Latina/o to the Supreme Court would signal a movement toward full membership for Latina/os in American social life”).
104. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 27, 49–51 (noting that “a
‘critical mass’ of minority group members serving on the bench would be more
likely to transform the Court toward a more sophisticated understanding of
race and racism”).
105. Nahal Toosi, Ginsburg: ‘Any Woman Will Not Do’ for Job, ABCNEWS
.COM, Sept. 21, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=1147816.
Justice Ginsburg proclaimed, “[A]ny woman will not do . . . . [There are] some
women who might be appointed who would not advance human rights or
women’s rights . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

